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Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government's decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an optimal haircut to bondholders. We show that when the size of senior tranches is small, a version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds: tranching just redistributes government revenues from junior to senior bondholders, while taxes and government borrowing costs remain unchanged. However, as senior tranches become sufficiently large, default costs on senior debt transpire into a stronger commitment to repay not only the senior tranche, but also the junior one. We show that there is a lower threshold for senior bonds above which tranching can eliminate default on both junior and senior debt, and an upper threshold beyond which the government defaults also on senior debt.
This paper investigates whether the structure of sovereign debt seniority influences a government's choice between defaulting and accumulating surpluses. The authors employ a model of debt crises where a government with discretionary powers endogenously selects distortionary taxation and decides whether to impose an optimal haircut on bondholders. They demonstrate that when the proportion of senior debt is small, a Modigliani-Miller theorem-like outcome occurs, with tranching merely shifting revenue from junior to senior bondholders without altering taxes or borrowing costs. However, as the size of senior tranches increases, the costs associated with defaulting on senior debt create a stronger incentive for repayment of both senior and junior tranches.
This academic paper, authored by Giancarlo Corsetti, Luca Dedola, and Anil Ari, delves into the complex relationship between debt seniority and sovereign debt crises. The research presents a theoretical model to explore how the structure of debt can influence a government's decision-making regarding defaults and surplus accumulation. The findings suggest that the size of senior debt tranches plays a critical role, potentially acting as a commitment device for repayment or, conversely, leading to defaults on senior debt itself under certain conditions.
Page Count:
43
Publication Date:
2018-05-09
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN-10:
1484356217
ISBN-13:
9781484356210
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