Author Description

While the United States Army's artillery branch transitioned to fight a counter-insurgency fight for over 15 years, other militaries' artillery arms were in a transition as well. The use of U.S. artillery was limited in the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia fought in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, all using artillery, the so called "god of war," as the centerpiece of their tactical and operational approach. Russia used lessons learned from each of these conflicts as well as the United States' conflicts in adapting their use of artillery. This thesis is a comparative study of Russian cannon artillery from 2000 to 2016, and what the United States Army, and more precisely, the artillery community of the United States Army, should learn from what the Russians implemented. Although this generation of warfare is perceived as new, the use of artillery on the battlefield remains relatively unchanged.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION * Overview * Primary Research Question * Secondary Research Questions * Definition and Terms * Assumptions * Limitations and Delimitations * Significance * Conclusion * CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW * Introduction * Background * Second Chechen War * Russian-Georgian War * Russian-Ukrainian Conflict * Practical Application * Conclusion * CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY * Introduction * Doctrine * Organization * Training * Materiel * Leadership and Education * Personnel * Reasoning for Choosing the Years 2000 Through 2016 * Conclusion * CHAPTER 4 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS * Introduction * Doctrine * Organization * Training * Materiel * Leadership and Education * Personnel * Summary * Russian Artillery Lessons Learned from Second Chechen War * Russian Artillery Lessons Learned from the Russo-Georgian War * Russian Artillery Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict * Conclusion * CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM