The differences between well-designed security and poorly designed security are not always readily apparent. Poorly designed systems give the appearance of being secure but can over-authorize users or allow access to non-users in subtle ways. The problem is that poorly designed security gives a false sense of confidence. In some ways, it is better to knowingly have no security than to have inadequate security believing it to be stronger than it actually is. But how do you tell the difference? Although it is not rocket science, designing and implementing strong security requires strong foundational skills, some examples to build on, and the capacity to devise new solutions in response to novel challenges. This IBM® Redbooks® publication addresses itself to the first two of these requirements. This book is intended primarily for security specialists and IBM WebSphere® MQ administrators that are responsible for securing WebSphere MQ networks but other stakeholders should find the information useful as well. Chapters 1 through 6 provide a foundational background for WebSphere MQ security. These chapters take a holistic approach positioning WebSphere MQ in the context of a larger system of security controls including those of adjacent platforms' technologies as well as human processes. This approach seeks to eliminate the simplistic model of security as an island, replacing it instead with the model of security as an interconnected and living system. The intended audience for these chapters includes all stakeholders in the messaging system from architects and designers to developers and operations. Chapters 7 and 8 provide technical background to assist in preparing and configuring the scenarios and chapters 9 through 14 are the scenarios themselves. These chapters provide fully realized example configurations. One of the requirements for any scenario to be included was that it must first be successfully implemented in the team's lab environment. In ad