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Proposes a theory which incorporates P.T. Geach's much-criticized claim that items identical with respect to one general noun, or covering concept, may be distinct with respect to another; but it differs from Geach's own position in denying that all identity relations are relative identity relations.
This book investigates the logical validity and philosophical implications of relative identity, specifically addressing whether identity can be dependent on a covering concept. Nicholas Griffin, an established scholar in logic and philosophy, evaluates the controversial claims originally proposed by P.T. Geach. The text constructs a nuanced argument that acknowledges the utility of relative identity in certain contexts while rejecting the radical position that all identity relations are inherently relative. By analyzing the intersection of language, ontology, and logic, Griffin provides a rigorous framework for understanding how objects are identified and distinguished.
What You Will Find
Experts in analytic philosophy recognize this work as a significant contribution to the debate surrounding identity and predicate logic. Readers frequently note the high level of technical density and the rigorous, academic nature of the prose throughout the text.
Page Count:
246
Publication Date:
1977-06-09
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0198244096
ISBN-13:
9780198244097
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