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Paul Katsafanas explores how we might justify normative claims as diverse as "murder is wrong" and "agents have reason to take the means to their ends." He offers an original account of constitutivism--the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to them simply in virtue of acting--and argues that the attractions of this view are considerable: constitutivism promises to resolve longstanding philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims. The greatest challenge for any constitutivist theory is developing a conception of action that is minimal enough to be independently plausible, but substantial enough to yield robust normative results. Katsafanas argues that the current versions of constitutivism fall short on this score. However, we can generate a successful version by employing a more nuanced theory of action. Drawing on recent empirical work on human motivation as well as a model of agency indebted to the work of Nietzsche, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics argues that every episode of action aims jointly at agential activity and power. An agent manifests agential activity if she approves of her action, and further knowledge of the motives figuring in the etiology of her action would not undermine this approval. An agent aims at power if she aims at encountering and overcoming obstacles or resistances in the course of pursuing other, more determinate ends. These structural features of agency both constitute events as actions and generate standards of assessment for action. Using these results, Katsafanas shows that we can derive substantive and sometimes surprising normative claims from facts about the nature of agency.
This book investigates how normative claims can be justified by examining the constitutive nature of human agency. Paul Katsafanas, a scholar of moral philosophy, critiques existing versions of constitutivism and proposes a new framework that integrates empirical research on motivation with a Nietzschean model of agency. He argues that by understanding the structural aims of action—specifically agential activity and power—one can derive substantive normative standards that address long-standing puzzles in ethics.
What You Will Find
Scholars in the field recognize this work as a significant contribution to the debate surrounding meta-ethics and the foundations of normativity. Experts frequently highlight the text for its rigorous synthesis of Nietzschean philosophy with modern action theory, making it a dense but essential read for those studying the intersection of agency and moral justification.
Page Count:
288
Publication Date:
2016-02-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0198748140
ISBN-13:
9780198748144
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