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This is a book about why we do what we do. It's also about how we arrive at an understanding of other people's actions. A traditional view in philosophy - 'common-sense psychology' - holds that representational mental states (paradigmatically, beliefs and desires) lie at the heart of intentional action and social cognition. According to this view, intentional actions are responses to mental states which capture a person's reasons for action: I open the cookie jar because I'd like a cookie and believe there is one in there. As a corollary, understanding someone else's action is often held to depend on attributing them plausible mental states and reasoning: I think you opened the cookie jar because you wanted a cookie and believed there was one in there. However, this approach has been thrown into doubt by experimental findings which apparently show that common-sense psychology's appeal to reasons and reasoning is overly demanding and overly intellectualising, painting an idealised picture of decision-making which is rarely borne out by the evidence. If we get out of our armchairs and examine how people actually make decisions, the claim is, what we find is that people don't do what they do, typically, based on the reasons they have, nor do people understand one another's actions via attributing them beliefs and desires and rational processing involving those kinds of states. In short, what we find is that common-sense psychology is wrong. This book is an attempt to reject that line of argument and to defend the common-sense perspective.
This book investigates whether common-sense psychology, which posits that intentional actions are driven by beliefs and desires, remains a viable framework for understanding human behavior in light of modern experimental challenges. Emma Borg, a philosopher of language and mind, evaluates the critique that traditional rationalist models of decision-making are overly intellectualized and disconnected from empirical reality. She argues against the view that human action is primarily non-rational or automatic, seeking to defend the validity of reason-based explanations in social cognition.
What You Will Find
Experts recognize this work as a significant contribution to the ongoing debate between traditional philosophy of mind and contemporary cognitive science. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which is tailored for those familiar with analytic philosophy and the philosophy of action.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
2024-01-01
Publisher:
New York : Oxford University Press,
ISBN-10:
019892903X
ISBN-13:
9780198929031
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