This book investigates the complex nature of intentionality across various developmental and cognitive contexts. The contributors, leading scholars in their fields, explore how intentionality is demonstrated in imitation, early mental state understanding, primate reasoning, executive function, language acquisition, and narrative comprehension. They highlight intentionality as a crucial concept in the cognitive and social sciences, drawing parallels to J. Mark Baldwin's early work on the control of action and its developmental link to self-consciousness and the understanding of others' perspectives.

This collection of essays is recognized for its rigorous examination of intentionality, a fundamental concept in the cognitive and social sciences. The contributors, all leading scholars, offer diverse perspectives on how intentionality manifests across different domains, from infant imitation to primate cognition and language development. The book is noted for its synthesis of developmental psychology and philosophy of mind, particularly its engagement with historical perspectives like J. Mark Baldwin's work. The collective effort aims to demonstrate the centrality of intentionality in understanding human and animal cognition.