
Cover -- Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication Page -- Contents -- List Of Figures -- List Of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Political Order And ''stability'' -- 1.2 Seepage -- 1.3 Repressive Assistance -- 1.4 Backlash -- 1.5 Surveillance And Preemptive Control -- 1.6 Data -- 1.7 Overview Of The Book -- 2 Fixating On Political Order -- 2.1 Evolving Relationship Between Dibao And Political Order -- 2.1.1 Origins Of Dibao: Resolving Underlyingmotives For Protest -- 2.1.2 Metamorphosis Of Dibao: Serving The Comprehensive Management Of Public Security 2.2 Suppressing Instability, Implementing Order -- 2.2.1 Seeking Order Through Party Institutions -- 2.2.2 Seepage Of Political Order -- 2.3 Basic Contours Of The Dibao Policy -- 2.3.1 Related Social Assistance Programs -- 2.3.2 Dibao In The Context Ofwelfare In China -- 3 Reacting At The Threat Of Disorder -- 3.1 Experimental Design -- 3.1.1 Treatment Conditions -- 3.1.2 Ethical Considerations -- 3.1.3 Randomization And Balance -- 3.2 Threat Of Collective Action On Government Responsiveness To Dibao Applicants -- 4 Distributing Social Assistance To Preempt Disorder 4.1 Financing And Fiscal Constraints -- 4.2 Limiting Dibao To Maximize Work -- 4.2.1 Residents Committees -- 4.2.2 Gatekeepers Of Dibao -- 4.2.3 Limiting Dibao To The Infirm -- 4.3 Prioritizing Dibao To Preempt Disorder -- 4.3.1 Background On Targeted Populations -- 4.3.2 Neighborhood-level Surveillance -- 4.3.3 Distributing Dibao To Targeted Populations -- 5 Repressing With Social Assistance -- 5.1 Repression Without Coercion -- 5.2 Conversion Of Social Assistance For Repression -- 5.3 How Repressive Assistance Works -- 5.3.1 Repeated Interactions -- 5.3.2 Facilitating Surveillance 5.3.3 Obligation And Dependence -- 5.4 Limitations On Effectiveness -- 5.4.1 Heuristics In Identification -- 5.4.2 Variation In Intensity And Timing Of Interactions -- 6 Triggering Backlash -- 6.1 Discontent In The Neighborhood -- 6.1.1 Rule-based Resisters -- 6.1.2 Bargainers -- 6.2 Higher Levels Of Collective Action -- 6.3 Worsening Perceptions Of Government Performance And Legitimacy -- 7 Becoming A Digital Dictatorship -- 7.1 Role Of The Public Inmass Surveillance -- 7.2 Mass Surveillance In The Digital Age -- 7.3 Perils Of Prediction -- 7.4 Call For Future Research -- Appendix -- References Jennifer Pan. Index Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.
This book investigates how authoritarian regimes, specifically in China, utilize social assistance programs as tools for political control and the maintenance of social order. Jennifer Pan, a professor of communication and political science, utilizes a combination of large-scale data analysis, field experiments, and qualitative evidence to argue that welfare programs like the Dibao system are strategically deployed to preempt collective action and monitor potentially dissident populations.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in political science and Chinese studies recognize this work as a rigorous empirical examination of how non-democratic states leverage social services for political survival. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose and the sophisticated use of experimental data to support the author's claims.
Page Count:
288
Publication Date:
2020-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press,
ISBN-10:
0190087447
ISBN-13:
9780190087449
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