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Ever Since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Used Imperial Presidency As A Book Title, The Term Has Become Central To The Debate About The Balance Of Power In The U.s. Government. Since The Presidency Of George W. Bush, When Advocates Of Executive Power Such As Dick Cheney Gained Ascendancy, The Argument Has Blazed Hotter Than Ever. Many Argue The Constitution Itself Is In Grave Danger. What Is To Be Done? The Answer, According To Legal Scholars Eric Posner And Adrian Vermeule, Is Nothing. In The Executive Unbound, They Provide A Bracing Challenge To Conventional Wisdom, Arguing That A Strong Presidency Is Inevitable In The Modern World. Most Scholars, They Note, Object To Today's Level Of Executive Power Because It Varies So Dramatically From The Vision Of The Framers Of The Constitution. But Posner And Vermeule Closely Examine James Madison's Writings, And Find Fault With His Premises. Like An Ideal Market, They Write, Madison's Separation Of Powers Has No Central Director, But It Lacks The Price System Which Gives An Economy Its Structure; There Is Nothing In Checks And Balances That Intrinsically Generates Order Or Promotes Positive Arrangements. In Fact, The Greater Complexity Of The Modern World Produces A Concentration Of Power, Particularly In The White House. The Authors Chart The Rise Of Executive Authority, Noting That Among Strong Presidents Only Nixon Has Come In For Severe Criticism, Leading To Legislation Which Was Designed To Limit The Presidency, Yet Which Failed To Do So. Political, Cultural And Social Restraints, They Argue, Have Been More Effective In Preventing Dictatorship Than Any Law. The Executive-centered State Tends To Generate Political Checks That Substitute For The Legal Checks Of The Madisonian Constitution.
This book investigates whether the modern expansion of executive power represents a constitutional crisis or an inevitable adaptation to the complexities of the contemporary state. Authors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, both distinguished legal scholars, challenge the prevailing academic reliance on the Madisonian model of checks and balances. They argue that the traditional constitutional framework is insufficient for modern governance and that the concentration of power in the executive branch is a functional necessity rather than a democratic failure. By analyzing historical precedents and political theory, they posit that informal political and social constraints serve as more effective safeguards against tyranny than rigid legalistic structures.
What You Will Find
Legal scholars and political analysts frequently cite this work as a provocative counter-narrative to traditional constitutionalist critiques of the presidency. Readers often note the academic density of the prose, which demands a high level of familiarity with American political history and legal theory.
Page Count:
256
Publication Date:
2011-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press, Incorporated
ISBN-10:
0199830460
ISBN-13:
9780199830466
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