
As an Amazon Associate and affiliate partner, Menrva Books earns from qualifying purchases. Learn more
Since The 1960s, America's Policymaking System Has Transitioned From One In Which Leaders Like Lyndon Johnson Could Simply Disparage The Concept Of Budget Projections To One In Which Policymakers Consciously Manipulate Cost Estimates. Paradoxically, The Very Safeguards Put In Place To Thwart Economically Unsound Legislation Now Cause Chaos By Incentivizing The Development Of Flawed, Even Blatantly Unworkable, Policies. As Robert Saldin Shows In When Bad Policy Makes Good Politics, The Pathologies Of The New System Are Illustrated By The Community Living Assistance Services And Supports Act And Its Role In Aiding Passage Of President Obama's Landmark Health Reform Law. Class Was Supposed To Bring Much Needed Relief Of America's Dysfunctional Long-term Care System, But Critics Argued That Its Flawed Design Rendered The Program Unviable. However, What Appeared To Be A Naïve Proposal Was Actually A Carefully Framed Policy Designed To Fit The Rules Of The Game, Particularly The Congressional Budget Office's Cost-projection Process. Although Class Was Destined For A Death Spiral Requiring Massive Government Bailouts, The Cbo Estimated It Would Save Tens Of Billions Of Dollars. These Official Savings Made Class An Appealing Add-on To The Affordable Care Act. But When The Obama Administration Later Announced That Class Was Impossible To Implement, America's Long-term Care System Was Left In Crisis. This Skillful Examination Of Class And The Machinations Of Congress Provides Insight Into How The Contemporary Policymaking Process Really Functions.
This book investigates how the modern American policymaking system incentivizes the creation of flawed legislation by prioritizing adherence to Congressional Budget Office cost projections over substantive policy viability. Robert P. Saldin, a political scientist, utilizes the history of the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act to demonstrate how political actors manipulate budgetary rules to secure legislative victories. He argues that the current system creates a paradox where safeguards intended to prevent fiscal irresponsibility instead encourage the development of unworkable programs that are designed primarily to pass through the legislative process.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts and political analysts frequently cite this work as a clear-eyed examination of the perverse incentives inherent in contemporary congressional budget scoring. Readers often note the academic density of the prose, which provides a rigorous look at how procedural rules shape the outcomes of major national legislation.
Page Count:
208
Publication Date:
2017-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press, Incorporated
ISBN-10:
0190255455
ISBN-13:
9780190255459
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!