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Since the 1960s, America's policymaking system has transitioned from one in which leaders like Lyndon Johnson could simply disparage the concept of budget projections to one in which policymakers consciously manipulate cost estimates. Paradoxically, the very safeguards put in place to thwart economically unsound legislation now cause chaos by incentivizing the development of flawed, even blatantly unworkable, policies. As Robert Saldin shows in When Bad Policy Makes Good Politics, the pathologies of the new system are illustrated by the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act and its role in aiding passage of President Obama's landmark health reform law. CLASS was supposed to bring much needed relief of America's dysfunctional long-term care system, but critics argued that its flawed design rendered the program unviable. However, what appeared to be a naïve proposal was actually a carefully framed policy designed to fit the rules of the game, particularly the Congressional Budget Office's cost-projection process. Although CLASS was destined for a "death spiral" requiring massive government bailouts, the CBO estimated it would save tens of billions of dollars. These official "savings" made CLASS an appealing add-on to the Affordable Care Act. But when the Obama administration later announced that CLASS was impossible to implement, America's long-term care system was left in crisis. This skillful examination of CLASS and the machinations of Congress provides insight into how the contemporary policymaking process really functions.
This book investigates how the modern American policymaking system incentivizes the creation of flawed legislation by prioritizing budget projections over substantive policy viability. Robert P. Saldin, a political scientist, utilizes the legislative history of the Affordable Care Act to demonstrate how policymakers manipulate Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost estimates. The work argues that the current institutional framework forces legislators to prioritize political optics and budgetary scoring, often at the expense of long-term program functionality.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts and political scientists frequently cite this work as a precise examination of the perverse incentives created by modern budgetary rules in Congress. Readers often note the academic density of the prose, which serves as a rigorous analysis of how legislative mechanics influence policy outcomes.
Page Count:
176
Publication Date:
2017-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0190647302
ISBN-13:
9780190647308
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