
Measuring Government Effectiveness Is Essential To Ensuring Accountability, As Is An Informed Public That Is Willing And Able To Hold Elected Officials And Policy-makers Accountable. There Are Various Forms Of Measurement, Including Against Prior Experience Or Compared To Some Ideal. In Yardstick Competition Among Governments, Pierre Salmon Argues That A More Effective And Insightful Approach Is To Use Common Measures Across A Variety Of Countries, State, Or Other Relevant Political And Economic Districts. This Facilitates And Enables Citizens Comparing Policy Outputs In Their Own Jurisdictions With Those Of Others. An Advantage Of This Approach Is That It Reduces Information Asymmetries Between Citizens And Public Officials, Decreasing The Costs Of Monitoring By The Former Of The Latter -along The Lines Of Principal-agent Theory. These Comparisons Can Have An Effect On Citizens' Support To Incumbents And, As A Consequence, Also On Governments' Decisions. By Increasing Transparency, Comparisons By Common Yardsticks Can Decrease The Influence Of Interest Groups And Increase The Focus On Broader Concerns, Whether Economic Growth Or Others. Salmon Takes Up Complicating Factors Such As Federalism And Other Forms Of Multi-level Governance, Where Responsibility Can Become Difficult To Disentangle And Accountability A Challenge. Salmon Also Highlights The Importance Of Publics With Heterogeneous Preferences, Including Variations In How Voters Interpret Their Roles, Functions, Or Tasks. This Results In The Coexistence Within The Same Electorate Of Different Types Of Voting Behavior, Not All Of Them Forward-looking. In Turn, When Incumbents Face Such Heterogeneity, They Can Treat The Response To Their Decisions As An Aggregate Non-strategic Relation Between Comparative Performance And Expected Electoral Support. Combining Theoretical, Methodological, And Empirical Research, Salmon Demonstrates How Yardstick Competition Among Governments, A Consequence Of The Possibility That
How can the implementation of cross-jurisdictional performance metrics enhance democratic accountability and reduce information asymmetries between citizens and public officials? Pierre Salmon, an expert in political economy and public finance, utilizes principal-agent theory to argue that comparative performance data serves as a critical tool for voters. By analyzing policy outputs across different political and economic districts, the author posits that citizens can more effectively monitor incumbents, thereby shifting government focus toward broader public interests rather than narrow interest group agendas.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Scholars in the field of public administration identify this work as a rigorous exploration of the mechanisms linking comparative performance data to electoral outcomes. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which is tailored for researchers and policy analysts interested in the intersection of political economy and institutional design.
Page Count:
272
Publication Date:
2019-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0190499176
ISBN-13:
9780190499174
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