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For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. This argument is reasonable, but, empirically, we see that the US has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, this book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.
Does maintaining nuclear superiority beyond a second-strike capability provide tangible geopolitical advantages for the United States? Matthew Kroenig, a scholar in international security, argues that a robust nuclear posture is essential for national security. He posits that superior nuclear forces reduce the expected costs of conflict, grant significant bargaining leverage, and strengthen deterrence. The book utilizes a combination of historical case studies and quantitative data to challenge the prevailing academic consensus that minimal second-strike capability is sufficient.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in international security recognize this work as a significant challenge to the long-standing doctrine of minimum deterrence. Readers frequently note the academic rigor of the prose and the systematic approach the author takes in evaluating nuclear strategy.
Page Count:
280
Publication Date:
2018-02-22
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0190849185
ISBN-13:
9780190849184
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