
As an Amazon Associate and affiliate partner, Menrva Books earns from qualifying purchases. Learn more
In this collection of essays, most of which are of recent vintage, and seven of which appear here for the first time, Christopher S. Hill addresses a large assortment of philosophical issues. Part I presents a deflationary theory of truth, argues that semantic properties like reference and correspondence with fact can also be characterized in deflationary terms, and offers an account of the value of these 'thin' properties, tracing it to their ability to track more substantial properties that are informational or epistemic in character. Part II defends the view that conscious experiences are type-identical with brain states. It addresses a large array of objections to this identity thesis, including objections based on the alleged multiple realizability of experiences, and objections based on Cartesian intuitions about the modeal separability of mind and matter. In the end, however, it maintains that theories of experience based on type-identity should give way to representationalist accounts. Part III presents a representationalist solution to the mind-body problem. It argues that all awareness, including awareness of qualia, is governed by a Kantian appearance/reality distinction--a distinction between the ways objects and properties are represented as being, and the ways they are in themselves. It also presents theories of pain and visual qualia that kick them out of the mind and assign them to locations in body and the external world. Part IV defends reliabilist theories of epistemic justification, deploys such theories in answering Cartesian skepticism, responds critically to Hawthorne's lottery problem and related proposals about the role of knowledge in conversation and practical reasoning, presents a new account of the sources of modeal knowledge, and proposes an account of logical and mathematical beliefs that represents them as immunune to empirical revision.
This collection of essays investigates the fundamental nature of truth, the relationship between conscious experience and physical brain states, and the foundations of epistemic justification. Christopher S. Hill, a professional philosopher, utilizes a rigorous analytical framework to synthesize contemporary debates in metaphysics and epistemology. The text evaluates deflationary theories of truth, defends identity-based accounts of consciousness, and explores representationalist solutions to the mind-body problem through a series of structured arguments.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in analytic philosophy to navigate effectively. Experts highlight this work as a significant contribution to the ongoing discourse surrounding representationalism and the mind-body problem.
Page Count:
344
Publication Date:
2014-01-01
Publisher:
OUP Oxford
ISBN-10:
0191644102
ISBN-13:
9780191644108
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!