
Philosophers have long theorized about what makes people's lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. However, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse--thought and talk about what is good and bad for us; what contributes to well-being; and what we have prudential reason, or prudentially ought, to do. This situation is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and cries out for further investigation of what it is like and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, about which there has been extensive theorizing, in meta-ethics. Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse has three broad aims. Firstly, Guy Fletcher explores the nature of prudential discourse. Secondly, he argues that prudential discourse is normative and authoritative, like moral discourse. Thirdly, Fletcher aims to show that prudential discourse is worthy of further, explicit, attention both due to its intrinsic interest but also for the light it sheds on the meta-normative more broadly.
This book investigates the nature and normative status of prudential discourse, questioning what it means to speak of what is good or bad for an individual. Guy Fletcher, a philosopher specializing in value theory, addresses the relative lack of meta-prudential inquiry compared to the extensive field of meta-ethics. He constructs an argument that prudential discourse is inherently normative and authoritative, suggesting that understanding these claims is essential for broader meta-normative theory.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts recognize this work as a significant contribution to the under-theorized field of meta-prudential studies. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which is intended for professional philosophers and advanced students of ethics.
Page Count:
222
Publication Date:
2021-01-01
ISBN-10:
0191899100
ISBN-13:
9780191899102
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