Author Description

Sanford C. Goldberg Argues In This Volume That Epistemic Normativity - The Sort Of Normativity Implicated In Assessments Of Whether A Belief Amounts To Knowledge - Is Grounded In The Things We Properly Expect Of One Another As Epistemic Subjects. In Developing This Claim Goldberg Argues That Epistemic Norms And Standards Themselves Are Generated By The Expectations That Arise Out Of Our Profound And Ineliminable Dependence On One Another For What We Know Of The World. The Expectations In Question Are Those Through Which We Hold Each Other Accountable To Standards Of Both (epistemic) Reliability And (epistemic) Responsibility. In Arguing For This Goldberg Aims To Honor The Insights Of Both Internalist And Externalist Approaches To Epistemic Justification. The Resulting Theory Has Far-reaching Implications Not Only For The Theory Of Epistemic Normativity, But Also For The Nature Of Epistemic Assessment Itself, As Well As For Our Understanding Of Epistemic Defeat, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Responsibility, And The Various Social Dimensions Of Knowledge.