This volume investigates the viability of Michal Kalecki’s alternative proposals to the Keynes and White plans during the formation of the Bretton Woods system and evaluates their long-term implications for global economic policy. The authors, Jan Toporowski and Jerzy Osiatyński, compile scholarly contributions from an OECD conference to re-examine the historical critiques of the post-war monetary order. By contrasting the dominant institutional frameworks with the lesser-known perspectives of economists like Kalecki, Schumacher, Balogh, and Prebisch, the text argues that alternative paths for international financial stability were overlooked at the time of the conference. The work serves as a critical retrospective on the efficacy and limitations of the Bretton Woods institutions in the decades following their inception.

Experts identify this volume as a significant contribution to the history of economic thought, particularly for its recovery of neglected critiques from the mid-20th century. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which is intended for specialists in international economics and financial history.