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The Different Sciences Furnish Us With A Wide Variety Of Explanations: Some Work At Macroscopic Scales, Some Work At Microscopic Scales And Some Operate Across Different Levels. How Does These Different Explanatory Levels Relate To One Another, And What Is An Explanatory Level In The First Place? Over The Last 50 Years, More And More Philosophers-both Reductionists And Anti-reductionists-no Longer Subscribe To The Idea That The Best Explanation Resides At The Fundamental Physical Level. This Introduction Sets Out The General Idea Of Levels Of Explanation As It Has Figured In Philosophy Of Science And Metaphysics, And Identifies Some Themes Which Unite This Volume's Chapters: The Legitimacy And Usefulness Of Levels Frameworks In The Philosophy Of Explanation, How Levels Of Causal Explanation Relate To Each Other, How Levels Of Explanation Span Different Disciplines With Different Explanatory Approaches, And What Conditions Make For The Possibility Of Multiple Levels Of Explanation-- Provided By Publisher.