Author Description

What Drives Islamist Groups To Shift Between Nonviolent And Violent Tactics? When Do Groups Move Away From Armed Action, And Why Do Some Organizations Renounce Violence Permanently, Whereas Others Only Place It On Hold Temporarily? The Violence Pendulum Answers These Questions, And Offers A Theory Of Tactical Change That Explains Both Escalation And De-escalation. The Analysis Traces The Historical Evolution Of Four Key Islamist Groups: The Muslim Brotherhood And Al-gama'a Al-islamiyya In Egypt, And Darul Islam And Jemaah Islamiyah In Indonesia. Drawing On A Wide Variety Of Archival Materials, Interviews And Reports, Each Chapter Narrows In On Critical Turning Points In Each Organization, And Shows What Factors Best Explain Whether The Group Legitimizes And Resorts To Violence And Develops An Armed Wing. The Book's Main Contention Is That Islamist Groups Alter Their Tactics In Response To Changes In The Perceived Need For Activism, Shifts In The Cost Of Violent Versus Nonviolent Resistance, And Internal Or External Pressures On The Organization. However, Escalation And De-escalation Are Not Simply Mirror Images Of Each Other. Groups Turn Towards Violence When Their Grievances Escalate, Violent Resistance Is Feasible And Publicly Tolerated, And There Are Internal Or External Pressures To Act. Organizations May Renounce Armed Action When Violence Becomes Too Costly For The Group, Disillusionment Eclipses The Perceived Need For Continued Activism, And Leaders Are Willing To Rethink The Tactics And Strategies Of The Group-- Provided By Publisher.