Author Description

This Book Explicates And Defends Ethical Naturalism. It Explains The Naturalist's Position, Why It Is Important, And Why It Is Plausible Even Though It Faces Serious Objections. The Book Answers In Detail Many Such Objections, Including Moore's And Parfit's Objections, And Including The Just Too Different Objection. Underlying Many Of The Objections, And Motivating Them, Is The View That Ethical Naturalism Is Unable To Account For The Normativity Of The Ethical Facts And Properties That It Postulates. This Is The Normativity Objection, And The Book As A Whole Deals With This Objection. The Book Argues That Ethical Naturalism Is Able To Answer The Objection, And, Surprisingly, That It Is In A Better Position To Explain The Nature Of Normativity Than Its Alternatives, Such As Nonnaturalism, Constructivism, Expressivism, And So On. The Book Evaluates Various Answers That Ethical Naturalists Can Offer To The Challenge To Explain What Normativity Consists In. It Deals With Technical Issues About Metaphysical Analysis And Grounding, Both Metaphysical Grounding And Normative Grounding. It Examines Cornell Realism, The Canberra Program, Neo-humean Subjectivism, Neo-aristotelian Naturalism, And Pluralist-teleology-- Provided By Publisher.