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The child of a small coup rather than an extension of popular will, the Soviet State was intrinsically insecure, its leaders ever fearful of internal and external threats. They did not feel that their regime would be safe until the revolution triumphed abroad, convinced that the outside world was implacably hostile. None felt this more strongly than Stalin. Indeed, as eminent historian of the Soviet Union Vojtech Mastny argues, it was Stalin's insatiable craving for security, more than anything else, that was the root cause of East-West tensions and the Cold War. In The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, the long-awaited sequel to his acclaimed work, Russia's Road to the Cold War, Mastny offers a masterful history of the birth of the Cold War, drawing on extensive research in newly opened Soviet archives. Here Stalin takes center stage during the critical years 1947 to 1953, stamping East-West tensions with his personal blend of paranoia, ideology, ruthlessness, and wishful thinking. Indeed, given Stalin's personality and his unquenchable thirst for security, Mastny argues, the Cold War arose as an "unexpected but predetermined" event—far from planned, yet scarcely avoidable. As Mastny unfolds the history of this climactic era, he offers a new understanding of important aspects of the developing conflict—throwing sharp light, for example, on the Kremlin's relationship with foreign Communist parties (in both Eastern and Western Europe) and its very different responses to Tito and Mao. Indeed, the break with Tito demonstrates the depths of Stalin's paranoia: the Yugoslav leader actually thought he was doing Stalin's will, when all along his very similarity to Stalin alienated the Soviets—a case of "incompatible affinities," as Mastny writes. Here too is a fresh view of the outbreak of the Korean War: Stalin not only approved the attack, he actively armed and prepared the North's Communist army. And yet, he strangely left the most crucial war decisions to the North Korea
This work investigates whether the Cold War was an inevitable consequence of the Soviet Union's inherent institutional insecurity and Stalin's personal psychological profile. Vojtech Mastny, a recognized historian of Soviet foreign policy, utilizes newly declassified Soviet archives to construct his argument. He posits that Stalin's obsessive, paranoid pursuit of security transformed the Soviet state's ideological anxieties into a rigid, confrontational foreign policy. The book argues that the resulting East-West tensions were not necessarily the product of a grand, long-term plan, but rather the outcome of Stalin's specific, reactive, and often contradictory decision-making processes.
What You Will Find
Scholars and historians frequently cite this text as a significant contribution to the understanding of Stalinist foreign policy through the lens of archival evidence. Readers often note the academic density of the prose, which provides a rigorous examination of the motivations behind Soviet geopolitical maneuvers during the early Cold War.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
1900-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0198026579
ISBN-13:
9780198026570
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