
As an Amazon Associate and affiliate partner, Menrva Books earns from qualifying purchases. Learn more
No description available.
This work investigates the core question of whether phenomenal properties—the subjective qualities of conscious experience—are distinct from physical properties. Andrew Melnyk, a philosopher specializing in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, utilizes a physicalist framework to challenge the intuition that subjective experience necessitates a non-physical ontology. He systematically evaluates the arguments for property dualism, specifically focusing on how the internal perspective of consciousness might mislead our understanding of its underlying physical nature.
What You Will Find
Experts in the philosophy of mind recognize this text as a rigorous contribution to the ongoing debate between physicalism and property dualism. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in analytic philosophy to fully grasp the nuances of the author's arguments.
Page Count:
208
Publication Date:
2025-06-20
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
019894232X
ISBN-13:
9780198942320
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!