Author Description

Cover -- Perceptual Content -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface And Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I: Representation By The Chemical Senses -- 1: The Intentionality Of Smell -- 1. The Case Against -- 2. Rebuttal -- 3. The Thesis -- 4. The Case For -- 5. What Does It Represent? -- 6. What About The Environmental Objects? -- 2: What Does Taste Represent? -- 1. Taste Vs Flavor -- 2. The Problem Of Representing Intensity/concentration -- 3. Taste And The Person -- 4. Reconsidering Representing -- 5. Conclusion -- Afterword On Consciousness -- Part Ii: Layering 3: Introduction To Perceptual Layering -- 1. The Trees -- 2. The Bottom Layer -- 4: What Does Vision Represent? -- 1. Conservative Views Vs Liberal -- 2. Intractability Of The Dispute -- 3. Denying The Presupposition -- 4. Siegel's Method -- 5. More Substantive Objections To Siegel's Method -- 6. Layering -- 7. Aspect Perception Vs Layering -- 5: What Is It We Touch? -- 1. Ways In Which Touch Differs -- 2. Individuating The Senses -- 3. Commonsense Objects Of Touch -- 4. What Touch Represents: Preliminaries -- 5. What Touch Represents -- 6. Heat And Cold 7. Tactual Consciousness And Experience -- Part Iii: Beyond Layering -- 6: Complications -- 1. Ecologism -- 2. Two Problems -- 3. Interlude: Apologetic Recantation -- 4. Perceptual Vs Cognitive -- 5. Inference And Concepts -- 6. Limits On Distal Layering -- 7. Ordinary Language Vs Layering -- 8. Psychosemantics -- 7: Multimodality -- 1. Smell, Taste, And Flavor -- 2. Two Other Examples -- 3. Proprioception -- 4. A General Question About Multimodality And Consciousness -- 5. Summing Up -- Part Iv: Aspect Perception -- 8: Philosophy And The Duck-rabbit -- 1. The Puzzle 2. Received Wisdom From Wittgenstein, And Some Hope -- 3. Interlude: Aspect Perception And The Representational Theory -- 4. Getting Away From Vision -- 9: Hearing As -- 1. What Audition Represents -- 2. Continuing Assumptions -- 3. Auditory Aspect Perception -- 4. Further Subty