Author Description

This Book Explores The Dynamic Interaction Between Courts And Political Branches In Modern Democracies, Challenging The Conventional View That Courts Passively Moderate Political Behaviour By Reviewing The Constitutionality Of Policies. While It Is Generally Assumed That Lawmakers Self-censor Their Policies To Avoid Judicial Censure, This Book Demonstrates That Lawmakers Often Consciously Push Constitutional Boundaries, Signalling Their Willingness To Defy Court Rulings. The Book Argues That Courts, Unable To Enforce Compliance, Accommodate These Challenges To Protect Their Institutional Integrity, Showing Deference That Undermines Their Role As Checks On The Political Branches. Drawing On The Insights From A Formal Model And Original Empirical Evidence From The German Federal Constitutional Court's Exercise Of Constitutional Review Over Three Decades, The Book Shows That Lawmakers Can Successfully Pressure Courts To Ease Legal Constraints When They Confront Constitutional Review, Particularly In High-stakes Political Issues. The Book Provides Novel Insights Into Legislative And Judicial Behaviour, Offering Important Implications For Understanding The Limits Of Judicial Power In Democratic Systems-- Provided By Publisher.