Author Description

Scholars Of Distributive Politics Often Emphasize Partisanship And Clientelism. However, As Jennifer Bussell Demonstrates In Clients And Constituents, Legislators In Patronage Democracies Also Provide Substantial Constituency Service: Non-contingent, Direct Assistance To Individual Citizens. Bussell Shows How The Uneven Character Of Access To Services At The Local Level-often Due To Biased Allocation On The Part Of Local Intermediaries-generates Demand For Help From Higher-level Officials. The Nature Of These Appeals In Turn Provides Incentives For Politicians To Help Their Constituents Obtain Public Benefits. Drawing On A New Cross-national Dataset And Extensive Evidence From India-including Sustained Qualitative Shadowing Of Politicians, Novel Elite And Citizen Surveys, And An Experimental Audit Study With A Near Census Of Indian State And National Legislators-this Book Provides A Theoretical And Empirical Examination Of Political Responsiveness In Developing Countries. It Highlights The Potential For An Under-appreciated Form Of Democratic Accountability, One That Is However Rooted In The Character Of Patronage-based Politics.