
As an Amazon Associate and affiliate partner, Menrva Books earns from qualifying purchases. Learn more
Consciousness Isn't A Thing You Can Poke A Stick At. It's Not A Natural Kind, Like A Bit Of Quartz, Or Quarks, Or Water. Like Life, Which Can Be Attributed To Many Entities, But Is Not A Thing With Reality Apart From Living Entities, Consciousness Can Be Attributed To Conscious Entities Without Being Some Further Thing Or Fact, Some Mysterious, Mentalizing Force That Can Exist Without Conscious Entities. It Is Manifested In Conscious States And Creatures, But Isn't A Thing In And Of Itself. One Of The Enduring Puzzles About Consciousness And Conscious States Is How They, As Apparently Mental, Nonphysical States, Can Manifest In A Physical Entity Like A Brain. We Can Point To A Physical Bit Of Brain, To A Neuron, Or A Structure Like The Thalamus, But We Can't Locate The Consciousness Within That Bit Of Brain Or Its Neural Cells--
This work investigates the ontological status of consciousness and the ethical implications of its manifestation within physical biological systems. The author, L. Syd M. Johnson, utilizes a philosophical framework to challenge the notion of consciousness as a discrete, independent entity, arguing instead that it is a property attributed to conscious beings rather than a substance in itself. By examining the intersection of neural structures and mental states, the text addresses the persistent difficulty of reconciling nonphysical experiences with physical brain architecture.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in the field of philosophy of mind recognize this text as a rigorous contribution to the ongoing debate regarding physicalism and mental states. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a foundational understanding of metaphysical concepts to fully grasp the author's arguments.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
2022-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press,
ISBN-10:
0190943653
ISBN-13:
9780190943653
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!