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To Be Sure, There Are Many Uses Of The First-person Plural. In Some Cases, The Locution We Saw The Match Might Imply Nothing More Than A Common Object. If Each Of Us Saw The Match At Different Times Or Even At The Same Time, But Without Knowing Of Each Other's Presence, We Can Without Any Loss Replace We Saw The Match With I Saw The Match And You Saw The Match. But In Other Cases, We Say We To Express A Shared Perspective. Take, For Instance, The Case Where My Sons And I Return From The Stadium And, When Seeing A Common Acquaintance, I Shout We Saw The Match!. If We Saw The Match Together, And If Each Of Us Was Aware That The Other Was Also Seeing It, Something Important Would Be Lost By The Distributive Reformulation, Since The Use Of We Was Intended To Capture More Than Simply The Fact That There Was A Common Object. We Did Not Simply Happen To See The Match Side By Side, We Saw The Match Together, And Although I Didn't See The Match Through The Eyes Of My Sons, Its Having Been Seen By Them Is Part Of The Experience I Have Of It. Likewise, We Intend To Go To The Opera This Evening Are Open To Two Different Interpretations. It Might Mean That The Two Of Us, You And I, Each Has The Intention To Go To The Opera This Evening And Where Me Going To The Opera Will Satisfy My Intention. It Might, However, Also Mean That We Intend To Go To The Opera Together, And Here My Intention Will Only Be Satisfied If Both Of Us Go-- Provided By Publisher.
This book investigates the ontological and phenomenological structure of the first-person plural, asking what it means to act, perceive, or exist as a collective 'we' rather than a mere aggregate of individuals. Dan Zahavi, a prominent philosopher specializing in phenomenology and the work of Edmund Husserl, utilizes a rigorous analytical framework to distinguish between distributive and collective uses of the pronoun 'we.' He draws upon historical philosophical traditions and contemporary debates in social ontology to argue that shared experiences and intentions possess a unique structure that cannot be reduced to individual mental states. By examining the nuances of shared perception and joint action, the author clarifies the conditions necessary for genuine collective existence.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in phenomenology and social philosophy recognize this work as a significant contribution to the understanding of intersubjectivity and collective intentionality. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in philosophical terminology to fully grasp the nuances of the argument.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
2025-01-01
Publisher:
New York : Oxford University Press,
ISBN-10:
0191915483
ISBN-13:
9780191915482
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