Author Description

Cover -- Intentionality Deconstructed: An Anti-realist -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introducing Intentionality -- 1.1 First Acquaintance With Intentional Anti-realism -- 1.2 What Is Intentionality? What Is Its Source? -- 1.3 Intentionality As Transcendence, Intentionality As Relational -- 1.4 Against Intentional Primitivism -- 1.5 Functional Role, The Transcendence Of Intentionality, And Narrow Content -- 1.6 The Plan For The Remainder Of The Book -- 2. How To Settle Issues Of Intentionality, And A Tentative Argument For Intentional Anti-realism 2.1 Referential Diversity? -- 2.2 Do Philosophers Intuit Reference? -- 2.3 Can Theoretical Considerations Settle Issues Of Reference Determination? -- 2.4 A Lesson For Experimental Philosophical Semantics? -- 2.5 An Argument For Intentional Anti-realism -- 3. Against Phenomenal Intentionality As Intrinsic Reductive Intentionality -- 3.1 Preliminaries For Phenomenal Intentionality -- 3.2 The Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis -- 3.3 Phenomenal Intentionality As Grounding Intentionality -- 3.4 Arguments For The Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis -- 3.4.1 The Accuracy Conditions Argument 3.4.2 The Empirical Adequacy Argument -- 3.4.3 The Argument From Introspection -- 3.4.4 Disquotation And The Sense Of First-person Content Ascriptions -- 3.5 Conceptual Connections Between Consciousness And Intentionality -- 3.5.1 Searle's Argument -- 3.5.2 Mcginn's Argument -- 3.5.3 Against Conceptual Reductions Of Intentionality To Phenomenality -- 3.6 Against Synthetic Reductions Of Intentionality To Phenomenality -- 3.7 Against Intrinsic Reductions Of Intentionality -- 3.8 Indeterminacy Again 3.9 What Has Been Shown And What Has Not Been Shown Regarding The Intentionality Of Phenomenal States -- 4. Against Naturalistic Reductions Of Intentionality -- 4.1 The Idea Of Intentional Naturalistic Reduction -- 4.2 The Naturalistic Reduction Of Intentionality As A Scientific Reduction -- 4.3 Naturalistic Re