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When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. Not all misleading arguments wear their flaws on their sleeve. Each step of a misleading argument might seem compelling and you might not be able to figure out what's wrong with it. Still, even if you can't figure out what's wrong with an argument, you can know that it's misleading. One way to know that an argument is misleading is, counterintuitively, to lack expertise in the methods and evidence-types employed by the argument. When you know that a counterargument is misleading, you shouldn't engage with it open-mindedly and sometimes shouldn't engage with it at all. You shouldn't engage open-mindedly because you shouldn't be willing to reduce your confidence in response to arguments you know are misleading. And you sometimes shouldn't engage closed-mindedly, because to do so can be manipulative or ineffective. In making this case, Jeremy Fantl discusses echo chambers and group polarization, the importance in academic writing of a sympathetic case for the opposition, the epistemology of disagreement, the account of open-mindedness, and invitations to problematic academic speakers.
This book investigates the moral and epistemic obligations individuals have when encountering counterarguments to their deeply held beliefs. Jeremy Fantl, a philosopher specializing in epistemology, challenges the conventional wisdom of the Millian tradition and political liberalism. He argues that there are specific, identifiable circumstances where engaging with opposing viewpoints—or engaging with them open-mindedly—is not only unnecessary but potentially counterproductive to maintaining rational confidence.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts note that this work provides a rigorous challenge to standard views on intellectual engagement and academic discourse. Readers frequently highlight the density of the philosophical argumentation, making it a significant contribution to contemporary debates on epistemic responsibility.
Page Count:
256
Publication Date:
2018-01-01
Publisher:
OUP Oxford
ISBN-10:
0192535331
ISBN-13:
9780192535337
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