
Foreword -- Introduction Before the Cease-Fire U.S. Organization for the Cease-Fire Landgrab 73 Consolidating and Rebuilding The Third Indochina First Half-Year Cease-Fire II in MR 1 and 2 Cease-Fire II in MR 3 and 4 The Decline of U.S. Support 1974, Year of Decision Strategic Raids The Highlands to the Hai Van The Ring Tightens Around Hue The Last Phuoc Long On the Second Anniversary of the Cease-Fire The Central Highlands, March 1975 The Final Offensive in the North The Last Act in the South Was Defeat Inevitable? An infantryman, Colonel William E. Le Gro, USA (Ret.), fought in New Guinea and the Philippines in 1944 and 1945. Subsequent service included troop and staff duty in Germany and Korea and graduation from the Army War College. As a graduate student at American University in 1963 and 1964, the author specialized in East and Southeast Asia. He was also concerned with Southeast Asia while assigned to the office of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in 1964 and 1965. Colonel Le Gro served in Vietnam in 1966 and 1967 as G-2, 1st Infantry Division, and was Director of Asian Studies at the Army War College from 1969 to 1971. From December 1972 until 29 April 1975, he was a senior staff officer with the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and its successor agency, the U.S. Defense Attache Office, Saigon. DOUGLAS KINNARD Brigadier General, USA (Ret.) Chief of Military History
This work investigates the collapse of South Vietnam following the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, specifically examining the military and political factors that led to the final capitulation in 1975. Colonel William E. Le Gro, a veteran officer who served in the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Saigon during the final years of the conflict, utilizes his direct access to military intelligence and operational records to construct a detailed account of the war's terminal phase. He argues that the decline of U.S. support, combined with shifting strategic realities on the ground, created an environment where the South Vietnamese military could no longer sustain its defensive posture against North Vietnamese offensives.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Military historians and scholars frequently cite this work as a primary source for understanding the operational realities of the final years of the Vietnam War. Readers often note the technical density of the prose, which reflects the author's background as a senior staff officer and intelligence specialist.
Page Count:
186
Publication Date:
1996-08-01
Publisher:
United States Government Printing Office
ISBN-10:
016001929X
ISBN-13:
9780160019296
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