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In the wake of 9/11, the United States government has relied on a number of aggressive security measures to protect the nation. From domestic wiretapping without warrants to the surveillance of Muslim and Arab Americans and the coercive interrogation of suspected terrorists, the Bush administration's policies have attracted much controversy and been decried as outrageous violations of domestic and international law. In Terror in the Balance, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the legal and institutional basis of this critique is wrong. When governments strive to increase national security they should be given wide latitude to adjust policy and liberties in the time of emergency and war. Deference to the executive during emergencies, Posner and Vermeule contend, is necessary and powers must be made available to the executive when the increase in security justifies the corresponding losses from the decrease in liberty. Further, when the executive is compelled to implement controversial methods of protecting its citizens such as discrimination against aliens or censorship of hate speech, the judiciary should not interfere on constitutional grounds except in unusual circumstances. Courts and legislators are institutionally incapable of second guessing security policy, and trying to enforce ordinary law during times of emergency shackles government when it most needs flexibility. American constitutional law and international law do not provide reasons for courts or legislators to depart from their historical posture of deference to the executive during national emergencies.
This book investigates the appropriate balance between national security measures and civil liberties during times of emergency, specifically challenging the notion that judicial intervention is necessary to curb executive power. Authors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, both legal scholars, utilize historical precedent and institutional analysis to argue that the executive branch requires significant latitude to manage security threats. They contend that courts and legislators lack the institutional capacity to effectively oversee security policy, suggesting that deference to the executive is a functional necessity during periods of crisis.
What You Will Find
Experts and legal scholars frequently cite this work as a provocative contribution to the debate on executive power and constitutional theory. Readers often note the dense, analytical nature of the prose, which serves as a foundational text for those examining the limits of judicial oversight in national security contexts.
Page Count:
328
Publication Date:
2006-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
019804237X
ISBN-13:
9780198042372
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