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Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the author develops a view of concepts and their mastery, explores the role of groundless beliefs drawing on suggestions of Wittgenstein, illuminates aspects of the thought of Locke, Hume, Quine, and Goldman, and finally offers a response to a sophisticated variety of scepticism.
This book investigates the relationship between sensory experience and the formation of justified belief, challenging the prevailing view that experiences are merely propositional attitudes. Alan Millar, a philosopher specializing in epistemology, argues that sensory experiences are better understood as psychological states. He constructs a framework where justified belief arises from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, specifically those that allow individuals to respond appropriately to their environment. By integrating historical perspectives with contemporary analytical rigor, the author provides a robust alternative to standard representationalist accounts of perception.
What You Will Find
Philosophical scholars recognize this work as a significant contribution to the debate on perceptual justification and the nature of belief. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in analytical philosophy to fully grasp the author's nuanced arguments.
Page Count:
238
Publication Date:
1991-05-09
Publisher:
Clarendon Press
ISBN-10:
0198242700
ISBN-13:
9780198242703
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