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Our self-understanding as human agents includes a commitment to three crucial claims about human agency: that agents must be active, that actions are part of the natural order of the universe, and that intentional actions can be explained by the agent's reasons for acting. While all of these claims are indispensable elements of our view of ourselves as human agents, they are in continuous conflict and tension with one another, especially once one adopts the currently predominant view of what the natural order must be like. One of the central tasks of philosophy of action consists in showing how, despite appearances, these conflicts can be resolved and our self-understanding as agents be vindicated. The mainstream of contemporary philosophy of action holds that this task can only be fulfilled by an event-causal reductive view of human agency, paradigmatically embodied in the so-called 'standard model' developed by Donald Davidson. Erasmus Mayr, in contrast, develops a new agent-causal solution to these conflicts and shows why this solution is superior both to event-causalist accounts and to Von Wright's intentionalism about agency. He offers a comprehensive theory of substance-causation on the basis of a realist conception of powers, which allows one to see how the widespread rejection of agent-causation rests on an unfounded 'Humean' view of nature and of causal processes. At the same time, Mayr addresses the question of the nature of reasons for acting and complements its substance-causal account of activity with a non-causal account of acting for reasons in terms of following a standard of success.
This book investigates whether the conflicts between our self-understanding as active agents and the naturalistic view of the universe can be resolved through a new agent-causal framework. Erasmus Mayr, a scholar in the field of philosophy of action, challenges the dominance of the event-causal 'standard model' popularized by Donald Davidson. By drawing on a realist conception of powers and substance-causation, Mayr argues that the prevailing rejection of agent-causation is rooted in an unfounded Humean perspective on nature. He proposes a comprehensive theory that reconciles the necessity of human activity with the natural order while providing a non-causal account of acting for reasons.
What You Will Find
Scholars in the philosophy of action recognize this work as a significant contribution to the debate surrounding agent-causation and the limitations of the standard model. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in metaphysical inquiry to fully grasp the author's arguments.
Page Count:
320
Publication Date:
2011-11-14
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0199606218
ISBN-13:
9780199606214