
Lucy OBrien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.
This book investigates the relationship between human agency and the mechanisms of first-person reference and self-knowledge. Lucy O'Brien, a scholar in the field of philosophy, utilizes an analytical framework to examine how our capacity to act informs our understanding of ourselves. She argues that traditional accounts of self-knowledge often overlook the agentive nature of the subject, proposing instead that our knowledge of our own mental and physical actions is inextricably linked to our status as agents.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts and academics in the philosophy of mind recognize this work as a significant contribution to the debate on self-knowledge. Readers frequently note the rigorous and dense nature of the prose, which is intended for those with a background in philosophical inquiry.
Page Count:
244
Publication Date:
2010-01-01
Publisher:
Clarendon Press
ISBN-10:
0191615544
ISBN-13:
9780191615542
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