Author Description

Madison Powers And Ruth Faden Here Develop An Innovative Theory Of Structural Injustice That Links Human Rights Norms And Fairness Norms. Norms Of Both Kinds Are Grounded In An Account Of Well-being. Their Well-being Account Provides The Foundation For Human Rights, Explains The Depth Of Unfairness Of Systematic Patterns Of Disadvantage, And Locates The Unfairness Of Power Relations In Forms Of Control Some Groups Have Over The Well-being Of Other Groups. They Explain How Human Rights Violations And Structurally Unfair Patterns Of Power And Advantage Are So Often Interconnected. 0unlike Theories Of Structural Injustice Tailored For Largely Benign Social Processes, Powers And Faden's Theory Addresses Typical Patterns Of Structural Injustice-those In Which The Wrongful Conduct Of Identifiable Agents Creates Or Sustains Mutually Reinforcing Forms Of Injustice. These Patterns Exist Both Within Nation-states And Across National Boundaries. However, This Theory Rejects The Claim That For A Structural Theory To Be Broadly Applicable Both Within And Across National Boundaries Its Central Claims Must Be Universally Endorsable. Instead, Powers And Faden Find Support For Their Theory In Examples Of Structural Injustice Around The World, And In The Insights And Perspectives Of Related Social Movements. Their Theory Also Differs From Approaches That Make Enhanced Democratic Decision-making Or The Global Extension Of Republican Institutions The Centerpiece Of Proposed Remedies. Instead, The Theory Focuses On Justifiable Forms Of Resistance In Circumstances In Which Institutions Are Unwilling Or Unable To Address Pressing Problems Of Injustice. 0the Insights Developed In Structural Injustice Will Interest Not Only Scholars And Students In A Range Of Disciplines From Political Philosophy To Feminist Theory And Environmental Justice, But Also Activists And Journalists Engaged With Issues Of Social Justice. Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Structural Injustice -- 1.1.1. The World As We Find It -- 1.1.2. Theoretical Integration Of Human Rights Violations And Structural Injustice -- 1.1.3. Structural Injustice Within And Across States -- 1.1.4. Insights From Social Movements -- 1.1.5. When States Cannot Or Will Not Respond To Structural Injustice -- 1.2. Plan Of The Chapters -- Chapter 2. Well-being -- 2.1. The Place Of Well-being In Our Theory -- 2.2. The Socratic And Structural Dependence Arguments -- 2.2.1. Socratic Reflection -- 2.2.2. Caveats And Clarifications To Our Method Of Socratic Reflection -- 2.2.3. The Structural Dependence Argument -- 2.3. The Core Elements -- 2.3.1. Health -- 2.3.2. Knowledge And Understanding -- 2.3.3. Personal Security -- 2.3.4. Equal Respect -- 2.3.5. Personal Attachments -- 2.3.6. Self-determination -- 2.4. A Decent Human Life -- 2.5. An Alternative To Universal Endorsement Approaches To Justification -- 2.5.1. Empirical Approaches And Minimalist Conclusions -- 2.5.2. Interpretative Approaches -- 2.5.3. What A Justification For A Theory Of Structural Justice Should Seek To Achieve -- 2.6. Three Implications Of The Roles Of Our Conception Of Well-being -- 2.6.1. Deprivation In Well-being Is Not The Unique Concern Of Justice: What Is Distinctive About Our Theory? -- 2.6.2. How Does Our Structural Justice Theory Deal With Deprivation Not Caused By The Social Structure? -- 2.6.3. How Does The Connection Between Our Conception Of Well-being And Human Rights Differ From Its Connection To Unfairness Norms? -- Chapter 3. What Justice Is -- 3.1. Moral Importance And Stringency -- 3.2. Claimability And Specificity -- 3.2.1. Pre-institutional Benchmark Of Existence Or Pragmatic Normative Innovation? -- 3.2.2. Specificity And The Problem Of Multiple Realizability -- 3.3 Rightful Enforceability -- 3.3.1. The Legacies Of Mill And Locke -- 3.3.2. Taking Stock -- 3.4. Unfairness Norms -- 3.4.1. Intuitive Cases -- 3.4.2. From Subterranean Layers To Wider Social Contexts -- 3.4.3. The Place Of Unfair Power Relations Within Our Theory -- 3.4.4. Common Assumptions In Fairness And Human Rights Claims -- Chapter 4. What Structural Injustice Is -- 4.1. Significant Impacts, Structural Components, And Social Groups -- 4.2. Social Structural Components And Their Systematic Influence -- 4.2.1. Defining Characteristics Of Unjust Structural Influences -- 4.2.2. Institutional Structures -- 4.2.3. Informal Structural Influences -- 4.2.4. Institutional And Informal Influences Combined -- 4.3. Power, Advantage, And Social Position -- 4.3.1. Relative Position Within Relations Of Production -- 4.3.2. Race -- 4.3.3. Gender -- 4.3.4. The Importance Of Groups And Of Intersectional Group Memberships -- 4.4. Background Assumptions -- 4.4.1. Moderate Scarcity And Human Rights Fulfillment -- 4.4.2. Close Economic Systems -- 4.4.3. Free And Equal Citizenship -- 4.4.4. The Emergence Of Injustice -- Chapter 5. Well-being And Human Rights -- 5.1. The Function Of Rights -- 5.1.1. The Central Thesis Of Interest Theories -- 5.1.2. The Challenge From Control Theories -- 5.2. Dignity And Well-being Interests -- 5.2.1. The Moral Status Question -- 5.2.2. What Rights We Have -- 5.3. The Social Functions Of Human Rights -- 5.4. Institutional Counterpart Duties And General Responsibilities: A Pragmatic Approach -- 5.4.1. The Recipient Orientation Objection: First Steps -- 5.4.2. Taking Stock -- 5.4.3. Specification Of Institutional Counterpart Duties: The Linked Chain Argument -- Chapter 6. The Responsibility Of States -- 6.1. The Normative Uniqueness Of State Agency And Its Implications -- 6.1.1. Institutional Capacity -- 6.1.2. Political Legitimacy -- 6.1.3. Gaps In Responsibility For Human Rights And The Principle Of Moral Equal Protection -- 6.2. The Strong Statist Challenge -- 6.2.1. Normative Uniqueness Arguments -- 6.2.2. The Common Structure Of Strong Statist Arguments -- 6.3. National Self-determination Arguments -- 6.4. The Principle Of Interstate Reciprocity -- 6.4.1. Reciprocity And Fairness -- 6.4.2. Double Standards In Agricultural Trade Policy And Climate Change -- 6.4.3. Conclusion -- 6.5. The Power Of Non-state Institutions In The Current Global Order -- 6.6. Conclusion -- Chapter 7. Real-world Examples -- 7.1. National Sacrifice Zones: From Appalachia To Warren County -- 7.1.1. The Legacy Of Appalachia -- 7.1.2. Repeatable Patterns -- 7.2. The Globalization Of Sacrifice Zones -- 7.2.1. The Natural Resource Curse -- 7.2.2. Do The Benefits Offset The Burdens? -- 7.2.3. The New Natural Resource Curse -- 7.2.4. Global Dumping And Outsourcing: Toxics And Trash -- 7.3. Segregated Cities: Two Societies,... Separate And Unequal -- 7.3.1. The Modern Origins Of Segregated Residential Housing Patterns -- 7.3.2. Geographic Dispersion And Reconcentration Of Poverty: 2000 To The Present -- 7.3.3. The Poor (neighborhoods) Pay More (and Get Less) -- 7.3.4. Policing -- 7.4. Urban Slums: The Proliferation Of Informal Human Settlements -- 7.4.1. Urbanization And The Urbanization Of Poverty -- 7.4.2. Definitions And Characteristics Of Slums -- 7.4.3. The Informal Economy -- 7.4.4. Multidimensional Deprivation -- 7.4.5. Power And Deprivation -- 7.5. Conclusion -- Chapter 8. Resistance To Injustice: Activism And Social Movements -- 8.1. Individual Responsibility In A Nearly Just Society -- 8.2. Means And Goals Of Resistance In Less Ideal Circumstances -- 8.2.1. Organizational Insights From The Ethics Of Armed Conflict -- 8.2.2. Naming And Shaming -- 8.2.3. Boycotts And Divestment Campaigns -- 8.2.4. Blockades, Data Hacks, And Other Violations Of Law -- 8.2.5. Self-defense And Defense Of Others -- 8.3. Targets Of Resistance: Contributors And Beneficiaries -- 8.3.1. The All Or None Objection -- 8.3.2. Two Tiers Of Targeting Considerations -- 8.3.3. First-tier Considerations -- 8.3.4. Second-tier Considerations -- 8.3.5. Passive Complicity In Injustices By Others -- 8.3.6. Anti-democratic Conduct -- 8.3.7. Anti-competetive Conduct -- 8.3.8. Accountability Avoidance -- 8.3.9. A Cautionary Note -- 8.4. Conclusion: Well-being And Social Movements. Madison Powers And Ruth Faden. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.