
Modal realism says that non-actual possible worlds and individuals are as real as the actual world and individuals. Takashi Yagisawa defends modal realism of a variety different from David Lewis's theory. The notion of reality is left primitive and sharply distinguished from that of existence, which is proposed as a relation between a thing and a domain. Worlds are postulated as modal indices for truth on a par with times, which are temporal indices for truth. Ordinary individual objects are conceived as being extended in spatial, temporal, and modal dimensions, and their transworld identity is explicated by the closest-continuer theory. Impossible worlds and individuals are postulated and used to provide accounts of propositions, belief sentences, and fictional discourse.
This work investigates the ontological status of possible and impossible worlds by proposing a modal realism that diverges from the established Lewisian framework. Takashi Yagisawa, a philosopher specializing in metaphysics and logic, constructs a theory that treats reality as a primitive concept distinct from existence. By utilizing the closest-continuer theory, the author argues for a multidimensional view of objects that extends across spatial, temporal, and modal domains to address complex problems in semantics and belief.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Scholars in the field of analytic metaphysics recognize this text as a significant contribution to the discourse on modal realism and the semantics of impossible worlds. Readers frequently note the high level of technical density and the rigorous logical structure required to follow the author's arguments.
Page Count:
326
Publication Date:
2010-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0191573574
ISBN-13:
9780191573576
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