Author Description

Christopher S. Hill Offers An Original Philosophical Account Of Perceptual Experience: Its Intrinsic Nature, Its Engagement With The World, Its Relations To Mental States Of Other Kinds, And Its Role In Epistemic Norms. He Argues That It Constitutively Involves Representations Of Worldly Items, Which Can Be Explained In Broadly Biological Terms. Cover -- Perceptual Experience -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List Of Figures -- Epigraph -- 1: Representationalism -- I. Introduction -- Ii. Goals -- Iii. Fixing Ideas About Perception And Experience -- Iv. Teleosemantics Plus Representational Pluralism -- V. Selectionist Teleosemantics, Learning, And Cummins Teleosemantics -- Vi. Two Objections To The Foregoing Picture -- Vii. Conclusion -- 2: Appearance And Reality I -- I. Introduction -- Ii. Introspective Grounds For Perceptual Relativity -- Iii. Experimental Grounds For Relativity Iv. Appearance Properties -- V. Thouless Sizes -- Vi. More On Thouless Properties -- Vii. Objective Properties -- Viii. Conclusion -- 3: Appearance And Reality Ii -- I. Introduction -- Ii. Alternative Accounts Of Visual Appearances -- Iii. Aspects Of Perceptual Relativity Due To Peripheral Sense Organs -- Iv. Aspects Of Perceptual Relativity Due To Attention -- V. Thouless Properties And Causal Theories Of Representation -- Vi. Generalizing From Vision To Other Perceptual Modalities -- Vii. Appearance And Reality In Audition -- Viii. Appearance And Reality In Touch Ix. Appearance And Reality In Olfaction -- X. Conclusion -- 4: Perceptual Awareness Of Particulars -- I. Introduction -- Ii. Particularism Vs Existentialism -- Iii. An Argument For Existentialism -- Iv. Arguments For Particularism -- V. Awareness Of Particulars -- Vi. The Nature Of Objects Of Perceptual Awareness -- Vii. A Dual Systems Account Of Object Awareness -- Viii. A Unified Account Of Object Awareness -- Ix. Awareness Of Objects Qua Members Of Kinds -- X. Conclusion -- 5: Perceptual Phenomenology -- I. Introduction -- Ii. Dualism -- Iii. Phenomenal Representationalism Iv. Reasons For Representationalist Accounts Of Awareness -- V. An Objection To Phenomenal Representationalism -- Vi. Conclusion -- Appendix I: The Phenomenology Of Conscious Thought -- Appendix Ii: The Phenomenology Of Moods And Emotions -- 6: A Quasi-perceptualist Account Of Pain Experience -- I. Introduction -- Ii. Fixing Ideas -- Iii. The Damage Detection System And Its Relation To Pain -- Iv. Six Concerns About This Theory Of Pain -- V. Hurting -- Vi. Awareness Of Pain And Perceptual Awareness -- Vii. Conclusion -- 7: Perceptual Consciousness -- I. Introduction -- Ii. The Autonomy Thesis Iii. A Metaphysical Argument For The Autonomy Thesis -- Iv. A Fourth Argument For Autonomy -- V. The Categorical Base Hypothesis -- Vi. Phenomenal Consciousness -- Vii. Proposals About P-consciousness -- Viii. The Second-ordertheory Of P-consciousness -- Ix. The Adverbial Theory Of P-consciousness -- X. The Categorical Base Theory Of P-consciousness -- Xi. Conclusion -- 8: Percepts And Concepts -- I. Introduction -- Ii. A Theory Of Propositional Attitudes -- Iii. Percepts Are Metaphysically Independent Of Concepts Christopher S. Hill. This Edition Originally Published: 2022. This Is An Open Access Publication, Available Online And Distributed Under The Terms Of A Creative Commons Attribution - Non Commercial - No Derivatives 4.0 International Licence (cc By-nc-nd 4.0)--title Page Verso. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Ann Arbor, Mi Available Via World Wide Web.