
As an Amazon Associate and affiliate partner, Menrva Books earns from qualifying purchases. Learn more
This paper provides a theory model of trade finance to explain the "great trade collapse." The model shows that, first, the riskiness of international transactions rises relative to domestic transactions during economic downturns, and second, the exclusive use of a letter of credit in international transactions exacerbates a collapse in trade during a financial crisis. The basic model considers banks' optimal screening decisions in the presence of counterparty default risks. In equilibrium, banks will maintain a higher precision screening test for domestic firms and a lower precision screening test for foreign firms, which constitutes the main mechanism of the model.
This paper presents a theoretical model to explain the significant decline in international trade, known as the 'great trade collapse.' The model investigates how the inherent risks of international transactions increase relative to domestic ones during economic downturns. It further demonstrates how the reliance on letters of credit in international trade can worsen a trade collapse during a financial crisis. The core mechanism involves banks' optimal screening decisions when faced with counterparty default risks, leading to more precise screening for domestic firms and less precise screening for foreign firms in equilibrium.
This work offers a formal economic model to dissect the causes of a major disruption in global trade. Its focus on the interplay between transaction risk, financial crises, and banking practices provides a theoretical framework for understanding such events. The model's mechanism, centered on differential screening precision, highlights a key factor in the observed trade collapse.
Page Count:
35
Publication Date:
2011-11-01
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN-10:
1463924607
ISBN-13:
9781463924607
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!