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Cover -- Action And Interaction -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Table Of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I: Action -- 1: Actions And Abstractions -- 1.1 Pump And Circumstance -- 1.2 The Agentive Situation -- 1.3 Basic Actions -- 1.4 Basic Problems -- 2: Time In Action -- 2.1 Timing Is Not Everything -- 2.2 The Intrinsic Temporality Of Movement -- 2.3 Dynamical Timescales And The Sense Of Agency -- 2.4 Why Action And Experience Are Enactive All The Way Down -- 2.5 Intentional Action And The Narrative Scale -- 3: Action, Intention, And The Sense Of Agency 3.1 Initial Complexities In The Sense Of Agency -- 3.1.1 Motor-control Processes -- 3.1.2 Intentional Aspects In The Sense Of Agency -- 3.2 Intention Formation And Attribution -- 3.2.1 Intentions -- 3.2.2 Retrospective Attribution -- 3.3 Ambiguities -- 3.4 Pushing This Analysis Into The World -- Part Ii: Interaction -- 4: The Case Against Theory Of Mind -- 4.1 Two Theories Of Theory Of Mind -- 4.2 The Science Behind Tom -- 4.3 Eight Problems For Tom -- 4.3.1 The Starting Problem -- 4.3.2 The Diversity Problem -- 4.3.3 The Simple Phenomenological Objection -- 4.3.4 The Integration Problem 4.3.5 The Developmental Problem -- 4.3.6 Problems Of Pretense And Instrumental Control -- 4.3.7 The Matching Problem -- 4.3.8 Problems With The Reuse Hypothesis -- 5: Interaction -- 5.1 This Is It -- 5.2 Primary Intersubjectivity -- 5.3 Secondary Intersubjectivity In Joint Attention And Joint Action -- 5.3.1 Joint Attention -- 5.3.2 Joint Action -- 5.4 Of Three Minds -- 6: Direct Social Perception -- 6.1 Perceiving Intentions And Emotions -- 6.1.1 Perceiving Intentions -- 6.1.2 Perceiving Emotions -- 6.1.3 Non-inferential Perception -- 6.2 The New Hybrids -- 6.2.1 When Up Is Down 6.2.2 Perception And Extra-perceptual Inference -- 6.2.3 Predictive Processing And New Hybrid Theories -- 6.3 Over The Top: Some Concerns From Social Psychology -- 7: Communicative Actions And Narrative Practices -- 7.1 Communicative Action
This work investigates the core question of how human agency and social interaction are fundamentally structured through embodied, enactive processes rather than purely internal mental representations. Shaun Gallagher, a prominent philosopher of mind and cognitive science, utilizes a phenomenological framework combined with contemporary empirical research in neuroscience and developmental psychology to challenge traditional cognitivist models of the mind. He argues that action and social understanding are not merely products of internal 'theory of mind' mechanisms but are instead rooted in direct, bodily engagement with the world and other people.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in philosophy and cognitive science recognize this text as a significant contribution to the enactive approach to cognition. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in phenomenology and philosophy of mind to fully grasp the arguments.
Page Count:
288
Publication Date:
2020-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press,
ISBN-10:
0192585304
ISBN-13:
9780192585301
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