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Much of what we take to be meaningful and significant in life is inextricably linked with our capacity to experience emotions. Here, Jonathan Mitchell considers emotional experiences as sui generis states; not to be modelled after other mental states such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings, but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, he proposes an original view of emotional experiences as feelings-towards-values. Central to this view is the notion that emotional experiences include (non-bodily) felt attitudes which represent evaluative properties of the particular objects of those experiences. After setting out a framework for theorising about experiences and their contents, Mitchell argues that the content of emotional experience is evaluative. He then explains the best way to marry this claim with the presence of specific kinds of valenced attitudinal components in emotional experience and critical aspects of emotional phenomenology. Building on this, he introduces a distinctive role for bodily feelings, by way of a somatic enrichment of the felt valenced attitudes involved in emotional experience. Finally, he considers issues pertaining to the intelligibility of emotions, and shows how the feelings-towards-values view can account for the way in which emotional experiences often make sense in a first-person way.
This book investigates the core question of how emotional experiences function as unique mental states that represent evaluative properties of objects. Jonathan Mitchell, a scholar in philosophy of mind, constructs a framework that rejects traditional reductions of emotion to mere perception or judgment. He argues that emotions are best understood as 'feelings-towards-values,' where non-bodily felt attitudes serve as the primary mechanism for representing the significance of the world to the individual.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in the philosophy of mind recognize this work as a rigorous contribution to the debate regarding the intentionality of emotions. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which is intended for those familiar with contemporary analytic philosophy and phenomenological discourse.
Page Count:
224
Publication Date:
2021-01-01
Publisher:
OUP Oxford
ISBN-10:
0192661108
ISBN-13:
9780192661104
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