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The Epistemic Norms Should Matter. The Ones Philosophers Typically Focus On Do Not Matter Enough. So We Should Replace Them. While The Replacement Norms Will Agree To Some Significant Extent With More Standard Epistemic Norms, They Will Vary Quite Significantly As Well. They Will Permit Us To Form Some Seemingly Bad Beliefs - Beliefs That Violate All Standard Norms By Going Against Our Evidence, Being Incoherent, Or Even Being Clearly False - In Order To Improve Other Beliefs. In Fact, They Will Sometimes Allow Our Beliefs To Be Bad For No Reason Whatsoever. That Paragraph Summarizes The Project Of This Book. What Does It Mean? First, What Are Epistemic Norms? Answering This Is Complicated By The Fact That There Is No Uncontroversial Characterization Of The Epistemic And By My Goal To Engage With A Wide Variety Of Views. For That Reason, I'll Sketch The Extension Of What I Am Talking About Rather Than Try To Give A Definition That All Epistemic Norms Fit. This Is Only A Sketch; Anything That Looks Enough Like The Examples I'm Giving Here Is Probably An Epistemic Norm As Well. Perhaps The Most Traditional Characterization Of Epistemology Is As The Study Of Knowledge. I Don't Think That's How We Should Think About It, As You'll Eventually See, But It's A Good Place To Start. Knowledge Is One Possible Epistemic Norm - We Might Think That Our Beliefs Should Be Knowledge, Or That Knowledge Is That Standard Against Which We Should Measure Our Beliefs. Knowing That P Traditionally Requires That One's Belief That P Be Justified. The Standards For Justification Are Also Epistemic Norms. Sometimes Philosophers Talk About Beliefs Being Warranted Rather Than Justified, Or About Beliefs Being Rational, Or Theoretically Rational (to Differentiate These Norms From Those Of Practical Rationality). These Are Also Epistemic Norms. Epistemic Norms May Have To Do With The Pursuit Of Truth, Or Accuracy, Or Knowledge, Or Wisdom, Or Understanding. Epistemic Norms May Say That Our Beliefs