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This book provides a novel account of the dilemma over how "public goods"--including civil order, defense, social welfare--should be provided and who should provide them. The author shows how present systems, in an attempt at fairness, actually help breed the parasitic "free riding" they were meant to suppress. He argues that, in the absence of taxation, many public goods would be provided by spontaneous group cooperation. However, this would imply some degree of free riding that would eventually lead cooperating groups away from voluntary solutions and closer to compulsory ones, bringing the problem full circle. De Jasay argues that these conflicting incentives are the principle cause of the poor functioning of organized society.
This work investigates the fundamental tension between the provision of public goods and the emergence of free-riding behavior within organized societies. Anthony de Jasay, a political philosopher and economist, utilizes game theory and classical liberal logic to challenge the conventional necessity of state-mandated taxation. He argues that the pursuit of distributive fairness often exacerbates the very parasitic behaviors it seeks to eliminate, creating a cyclical reliance on compulsory systems.
What You Will Find
Scholars and economists frequently cite this text for its rigorous challenge to standard public choice theory and its provocative stance on voluntary cooperation. Readers often note the high level of analytical density and the author's uncompromising logical framework regarding the limitations of state intervention.
Page Count:
264
Publication Date:
1989-02-23
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0198244746
ISBN-13:
9780198244745
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