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This book examines an area of the world where arms control is almost non-existent--China, India, and Pakistan--and takes the unusual approach of considering the implications of conventional arms transfers, and in particular India's strategic defenses, for nuclear stability. Building on an analysis of their internal politics and attitudes to nuclear policies, it concludes that certain apparently defensive systems, particularly counter-air systems, have considerable implications for the retention of nuclear capabilities in the region.
This report investigates the complex intersection of conventional military modernization and nuclear stability among China, India, and Pakistan following the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Eric H. Arnett, a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), utilizes regional security data and political analysis to argue that conventional defensive systems, specifically counter-air capabilities, inadvertently destabilize the nuclear status quo. The text provides a framework for understanding how regional arms transfers complicate traditional deterrence models in South Asia.
What You Will Find
Experts recognize this report as a foundational analysis of the South Asian security dilemma during the late 1990s. Readers frequently note the technical density of the prose and its importance for understanding the strategic motivations behind regional military procurement.
Page Count:
112
Publication Date:
1998-05-07
Publisher:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
ISBN-10:
0198294115
ISBN-13:
9780198294115
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