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Intentionality Deconstructed Argues For The View That No Concrete Entity - Mental, Linguistic, Or Any Other - Can Possess Intentional Content. Nothing Can Be About Anything. The Concept Of Intentionality Is Flawed, And So Content Ascriptions Cannot Be Absolutely True Or False - They Lack Truth Conditions. Nonetheless, Content Ascriptions Have Truth Conditions And Can Be True (or Possess A Related Epistemic Merit) Relative To Practices Of Content Ascription, So That Different Practices May Imply Different (not Real But Practice-dependent) Intentional Objects For The Same Token Mental State. The Suggested View Does Not Deny The Existence Of Those Mental States Standardly Considered Intentional, Notably The So-called Propositional Attitudes; It Affirms It. That Is, Support Is Provided For The Existence Of Those States With The Properties Usually Attributed To Them, But Absent Intentional Properties. Specifically, It Is Argued That The So-called Propositional Attitudes Possess Logico-syntactic Properties, Whose Postulation Plays An Important Role In Addressing The Challenge Of Reconciling Intentional Anti-realism With Beliefs Being True Or Having Alternative Epistemic Merits, The Argument From The Predictive And Explanatory Success Of Content Ascription For Intentional Realism, And The Cognitive Suicide Objection To Views That Deny Intentionality. As Part Of The Rejection Of This Final Objection, Intentional Anti-realism Is Presented As A Radical View, Which Claims Nothing Can Possess Intentional Content But Not That Nothing Can Possess Intentional Content, And It Is Argued That This Is A Legitimate Characteristic Of Radical Philosophy. In Spite Of Rejecting The Claim That Talk, Intentional Anti-realism Gives Clear Sense To Its Dispute With Its Rivals As Well As To Its Own Superiority. Various Arguments For Intentional Anti-realism Are Presented. One Argument Rejects All Possible Accounts Of Intentionality, Namely Primitivism, Intrinsic Reductionism - The Prominent Exam
This work investigates the fundamental question of whether any concrete entity, mental or linguistic, can possess genuine intentional content. Amir Horowitz, a scholar in the philosophy of mind, challenges the realist assumption that mental states are inherently about objects or states of affairs. He proposes an anti-realist framework that denies the existence of intrinsic intentional properties while maintaining that propositional attitudes exist as entities with logico-syntactic properties. By decoupling intentionality from mental states, the author seeks to reconcile the predictive success of content ascription with a radical rejection of intentional realism.
What You Will Find
Scholars in the field of analytic philosophy recognize this text as a rigorous contribution to the debate surrounding mental representation and intentionality. Readers frequently note the high level of technical density and the demanding nature of the author's logical arguments.
Page Count:
224
Publication Date:
2024-09-24
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0198896433
ISBN-13:
9780198896432
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