
Cover -- Wittgenstein And The Possibility Of Meaning: To Follow A Rule Blindly -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1: Rule-following, Meaning, And Content -- 2: Kripke's Wittgenstein's Sceptical Argument -- 3: Boghossian And Wright On Blind Rule-following -- 4: Blind Rule-following, Properly Construed -- 5: A Non-reductionist Response To Kripke's Wittgenstein's Sceptical Argument -- Objection (a) -- Reply To Objection (a) -- Objection (b) -- Reply To Objection (b) -- Objection (c) -- Reply To Objection (c) -- Objection (c) Continued Reply To Objection (c) Continued -- Question (a) -- Reply To Question (a) -- Question (b) -- Reply To Question (b) -- Objection (d) -- Response To Objection (d) -- Epilogue -- References -- Index Alexander Miller. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.
This work investigates the philosophical problem of rule-following and its implications for the possibility of meaning, specifically addressing the skeptical challenge posed by Saul Kripke's interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Alexander Miller, a scholar of analytic philosophy, evaluates the debate surrounding whether meaning can be reduced to non-semantic facts or if it requires a non-reductionist account. He systematically critiques existing responses to the skeptical paradox and proposes a refined understanding of blind rule-following to preserve the objectivity of linguistic meaning.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in analytic philosophy identify this text as a rigorous contribution to the literature on rule-following and the philosophy of language. Readers frequently note the technical density of the prose, which is intended for advanced students and professional philosophers familiar with the Kripke-Wittgenstein debate.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
1900-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press,
ISBN-10:
0191946885
ISBN-13:
9780191946882
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