
Sense, Reference, and Philosophy develops the far-reaching consequences for philosophy of adopting non-Fregean intensionalism, showing that long-standing problems in the philosophy of language, and indeed other areas, that appeared intractable can now be solved. Katz proceeds to examine some of those problems in this new light, including the problem of names, natural kind terms, the Liar Paradox, the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary, and the Raven paradox. In each case, a non-Fregean intentionalism provides a philosophically more satisfying solution.
This book investigates whether adopting a non-Fregean intensionalist framework can resolve long-standing, intractable problems within the philosophy of language and related logical paradoxes. Jerrold J. Katz, a prominent philosopher of language, utilizes his expertise in semantic theory to challenge traditional Fregean assumptions. He argues that by shifting the foundational approach to sense and reference, one can achieve more coherent solutions to classic philosophical dilemmas. The text systematically applies this revised intensionalist methodology to demonstrate its explanatory power across various linguistic and logical puzzles.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts recognize this work as a significant contribution to the debate surrounding semantic theory and the limitations of Fregean logic. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in analytic philosophy to fully grasp the author's arguments.
Page Count:
240
Publication Date:
2004-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0190289155
ISBN-13:
9780190289157
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