
Cover -- The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Epigraph -- Contents -- List Of Illustrations -- Summary Of The Framework And Proposals -- Precautionary Framework -- Proposals About Specific Cases -- People With Disorders Of Consciousness -- Human Fetuses And Embryos -- Human Neural Organoids -- Other Animals -- Artificial Intelligence (ai) -- 1: A Walk Along The Edge -- 1.1 The Unmarked Border -- 1.2 Decision Points -- 1.3 When To Stop? -- 1.4 Accidental Golems -- 1.5 The Goal: A Precautionary Framework 1.6 A Note On Influences -- 1.7 Summary Of Chapter 1 -- 2: The Concept Of Sentience -- 2.1 Sentience And Consciousness -- 2.2 'phenomenal Consciousness' As Unstable Common Ground -- 2.3 Affective Space -- 2.4 Affective Spaces Beyond The Human Case -- 2.5 Three Views On The Nature Of Valence -- 2.6 The Ethical Significance Of Valence -- 2.7 Summary Of Chapter 2 -- Part I: The Zone Of Reasonable Disagreement -- 3: The Mind-body Problem -- 3.1 Disagreeing Reasonably About Sentience -- Baseless Recommendations -- Dogmatism -- Moral Views Beyond The Pale 3.2 Might Conscious Experience Leave No Trace On Behaviour? -- 3.3 Is Conscious Experience One Kind Or Many? -- 3.4 Radical Alternatives -- Interactionist Dualism -- Russellian Monism -- Biopsychism -- The Integrated Information Theory -- 3.5 Are Agency And Embodiment Necessary? -- 3.6 The Relevant Scale Of Functional Organization -- 3.7 Are There Borderline (indeterminate) Cases Of Sentience? -- 3.8 Summary Of Chapter 3 -- 4: Ethics And Religion -- 4.1 Bio- And Ecocentrism -- 4.2 Agency-centric Views -- 4.3 Consciousness Without Valence -- 4.4 Rationality-centric Views 4.5 Abrahamic Religions And The Stewardship Tradition -- 4.6 Indian Religions And Ahimsa -- 4.7 Summary Of Chapter 4 -- 5: The Science Of Consciousness And Emotion -- 5.1 Grades Of Optimism -- 5.2 The Conscious And The Unconscious: The Case Of Blindsight -- 5.3 The Conscious And The Uncons
This book investigates how we should make moral decisions when we are uncertain about whether a being—whether human, animal, or artificial—possesses the capacity for sentience. Jonathan Birch, a philosopher of science at the London School of Economics, utilizes a framework of precautionary ethics to navigate the 'zone of reasonable disagreement' regarding consciousness. He argues that when the stakes involve potential suffering, we must adopt a precautionary approach that prioritizes the moral status of entities even in the absence of definitive scientific proof of their subjective experience.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Experts in philosophy and AI ethics recognize this work as a significant contribution to the growing field of machine and animal sentience. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a foundational understanding of philosophy of mind to fully grasp the author's arguments.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
1900-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press,
ISBN-10:
019196672X
ISBN-13:
9780191966729
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!