Author Description

Why Do Some Militaries Support And Others Thwart Democratic Transitions? After The Arab Spring Revolutions, Why Did Egypt's Military Stage A Coup To End The Transition, While Tunisia's Did Not? On The Other Hand, Why Did Tunisia's Military Later Facilitate The Elected President's Dismantling Of Democracy? This Book Argues That A Military's Behavior Under Democracy Is Shaped By How It Had Been Treated Under Autocracy. Autocrats Who Had Empowered Their Militaries, Securing Their Loyalty Through A Share Of Power And Wealth, Create Militaries Who Fear That Democratization Will Encroach Upon Their Privileges. Empowered Militaries Are Thus More Likely To Repress Pro-democracy Uprisings, And If That Fails, To Stage Coups Against New Democracies. Where Autocrats Instead Marginalized Their Militaries, Democratization Is Considerably Easier. Yet, Marginalized Militaries Still Carry Risks Of Their Own, Being Less Able To Prevent A Descent Into Civil War, And More Easily Coopted Into Incumbent Takeovers. In Short, The Dictator's Choice To Either Empower Or Marginalize The Military Creates Legacies That Shape Both The Likelihood Of Democratization And The Forms By Which It Breaks Down. This Book Illustrates This Theory Through Detailed Case Studies Of Egypt And Tunisia, Drawing On Over 140 Interviews With Civilian And Military Leaders And Three Surveys Of Military Personnel. It Also Probes The Generalizability Of The Theory Through A Cross-national Analysis Of All Countries Between 1946-2010. Overall, The Book Brings The Military Front And Center To The Study Of Democratic Transition And Consolidation-- Provided By Publisher.